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1. INTRODUCTION
"I would rather be exposed to the inconveniences attending too much
liberty than to those attending too small a degree of it."
-Thomas Jefferson
Our Founding Fathers expressed the fundamental principles of our
country's democratic framework, declaring in the preamble to the
United States Constitution, "We the People of the United States, in
Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice . . . and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity .... Over
200 years later, we ask whether we as a country are carrying out these
principles when the government seeks to re-incarcerate rehabilitated
prisoners despite the government's negligence in delaying the com-
mencement of their sentences. Through the doctrine of credit for time
spent erroneously at liberty, which traces its origins back to the Tenth
Circuit's 1930 decision in White v. Pearlman, defendants have sought
credit toward their criminal sentences where their time spent out of
custody was attributed to government negligence.'
While numerous courts have confronted this doctrine, the Fourth
Circuit has never addressed whether a defendant may pursue the doc-
trine of credit for time spent erroneously at liberty as a means of re-
ceiving credit toward a federal criminal sentence.' In a less than
stellar performance, the United States District Court for the District
Court of South Carolina recently interpreted the doctrine's applicabil-
ity in Bradford v. Rivera.6 While the court's opinion in Bradford may
be unpublished, its lackluster legal analysis illustrates the need for a
consistent approach the Fourth Circuit and lower courts within that
1. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to A Friend (Dec. 23, 1791), in PA IIon Nunin I's; FRANK-
LIN, WASIN(ION, JFF IRSoN, WlnsrtiR, LINCOLN, Bii II- 63 (John R. Howard ed., 1899).
2. U.S. CONSI. pmbl.
3. White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1930); see Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 88
(1st Cir. 2009) (noting that the "doctrine was ... first articulated in ... White v. Pearlman"); see
also Danielle E. Wall, Note, A Game of Cat and Mouse-Or Government and Prisoner: Grant-
ing Relief to an Erroneously Released Prisoner in Vega v. United States, 53 VIlI.. L. RIv. 385,
396-97 (2008) (providing that following "its inception in White, the doctrine ... has been adopted
by a majority of circuits.").
4. See infra Part V.
5. See, e.g., Espinoza, 558 F.3d 83, 86-90; Kiendra v. Hadden, 763 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1985);
United States v. Greenhaus, 89 F.2d 634, 635 (2d Cir. 1937) (per curiam); Vega v. United States,
493 F.3d 310, 314-23 (3d Cir. 2007); Leggett v. Fleming, 380 F.3d 232, 234-36 (5th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Croft, 450 F.2d 1094 (6th Cir. 1971); Dunne v. Keohanc. 14 F.3d 335, 336-37 (7th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Downey, 469 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Clark v. Floyd,
80 F.3d 371 (9th Cir. 1996); Smith v. Swope, 91 F.2d 260, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1937); White, 42 F.2d at
789; United States v. Barfield, 396 F.3d 1144 (11th Cir. 2005).
6. Bradford v. Rivera, No. 9:11-462-RBH-BM, 2011 WL 5827788 (D.S.C. Oct. 14, 2011),
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jurisdiction can use to guide the review of future cases involving this
doctrine.
This article urges the Fourth Circuit to adopt the doctrine of credit
for time spent erroneously at liberty as a means of preserving liberty
and fundamental fairness in those instances where government negli-
gence postpones the commencement of a prisoner's sentence. The
recommendation to adopt this doctrine is supported by the fact that
the doctrine ensures that the government cannot delay the expiration
of a prisoner's sentence.' The doctrine also properly awards credit to
an individual when the government fails to timely incarcerate, or re-
leases and subsequently re-incarcerates that individual.'
Part 11 of this article introduces Mr. David Bradford, whose case
illustrates the varying legal theories associated with prisoners living
erroneously at liberty. Bradford was sentenced in Michigan and, with
the permission of the court, subsequently moved to Georgia to receive
brain cancer treatments over a six-month period." After that time ex-
pired, the government failed to designate a facility for Bradford to
serve out the remainder of his sentence.'o For more than six years,
Bradford lived erroneously at liberty and successfully rehabilitated
himself into society during this time." The government then informed
Bradford, albeit over six years after his sentencing, that he was to re-
port to a federal correctional institution in South Carolina.12 Gener-
ally, a federal prisoner's criminal sentence is governed by statute, and
the execution of that sentence is delegated to the Bureau of Prisons.
However, this situation poses the unique question of whether Brad-
ford must now serve his entire sentence, or whether is he entitled to
credit toward his sentence for the six years he spent at liberty.
Part III briefly discusses the applicable statutory provisions at issue
in Bradford's case. When adhering strictly to the statutes, Bradford's
sentence did not start until he voluntarily turned himself into the cor-
rectional institution." According to statutory provisions, Bradford
may not credit the time he spent at liberty;' 5 however, there are two
recognized exceptions to this general rule. Part IV of this article ad-
dresses the first exception, which is the likelihood of success if a de-
7. See Dunne, 14 F.3d at 336.
8. Id.
9. United States v. Bradford, 623 F. Supp. 2d 849, 850-51 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
10. Id. at 850.
11. Id. at 850-51.
12. Id. at 850.
13. See infra Part III.
14. Bradford v. Rivera, No. 9:11-462-RBH-BM, 2011 WL 5827788, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 14,
2011), report and recommendation adopted by No. 9:11-cv-00462-RBH, 2011 WL 5827601
(D.S.C. Nov. 18, 2011).
15. See infra notes 46-48.
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fendant were to bring a Due Process Clause claim in the Fourth
Circuit. However, this approach would not be optimal for Bradford
given Fourth Circuit precedent.'" Part V addresses the second excep-
tion, which is the doctrine of credit for time spent at liberty. This sec-
tion provides an overview of the diverse array of opinions17 regarding
the applicability and scope of the doctrine issued by United States
Courts of Appeals. This section also articulates two overriding
themes required for the doctrine to apply: (1) negligence on behalf of
the government, and (2) a defendant who is not at fault for his liberty.
Part VI provides a recommendation to the Fourth Circuit in light of
the Bradford decision to apply the doctrine in order to preserve lib-
erty by awarding sentence credit in instances of erroneously delayed
sentences. This article contends that the court should apply a two-part
test similar to the test employed by the Third Circuit" when deciding
whether to grant credit. As a threshold inquiry, the court should first
determine whether the defendant has "clean hands" or is not at fault
for the time spent at liberty. If so, the court should consider whether
the government was negligent in the postponement of the defendant's
sentence. In accordance with the framework of habeas corpus, the
defendant bears the burden of proof concerning the two foregoing re-
quirements. However, if both requirements are satisfied, the defen-
dant should be entitled to the credit.
Finally, this article's two-part test will be applied to Bradford's case,
with the recommendation that credit be awarded for the six years
spent living erroneously at liberty. This article concludes that this ap-
proach is not only consistent with the core principles of the American
criminal justice system, but is also substantiated by public policy
concerns.
II. THE BRADFORD STORY
On March 14, 2002, David Bradford was sentenced to an eighty-
four-month term of imprisonment by the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan for conspiracy to distribute co-
caine and marijuana, and laundering monetary instruments." How-
ever, in order for Bradford to pursue brain cancer treatment, the
sentencing court deferred his report date for six months.2 0
Later in 2002, Bradford's physician in Atlanta, Georgia, informed
Detroit's U.S. Probation Office that Bradford's cancer had
16. See Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 750 (4th Cir. 1999).
17. See supra note 5.
18. See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 319.
19. United States v. Bradford, 623 F. Supp. 2d 849, 850 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
20. Id. at 850- 1.
[Vol. 35:1
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progressed, was incurable, and that his life expectancy was only "1-2
years at best."2 1 When the six-month deferral period expired, there
were no court-ordered extensions or requests for extensions and the
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) did not designate a facility for Bradford to
voluntarily surrender himself.22 According to the government, "[I]n
light of [Defendant's] alleged exceedingly limited life expectancy, no
action was taken with respect to having the Bureau of Prisons desig-
nate an institution for service of [Defendant's] sentence until the sum-
mer of 2008." Bradford remained at liberty for more than six years
until the BOP instructed him to report to the Federal Correctional
Institution (FCI) Estill in South Carolina on September 4, 2008.24
During the six-year time period, Bradford continuously underwent
extensive medical treatment for his brain cancer and related health
conditions, which included one or more surgeries.2 5 He also found
work by starting his own towing business and made many positive
contributions to both his family and the surrounding community.2 6
During this time, Bradford kept in regular contact with a Pretrial Ser-
vices Officer of the Northern District of Georgia, and was fully com-
pliant with all of his bond conditions.2 7
After BOP finally designated a facility, Federal Correctional Insti-
tute in Estill, South Carolina (FCI Estill), Bradford voluntarily surren-
dered himself to begin serving his sentence on May 4, 2009.28
Bradford's current projected release date of May 19, 2015, reflects a
reduction of the sentence because of Good Conduct Time (GCT) Re-
lease. 2 9 Presently, Bradford has been credited with only twenty-one
days for previous time spent in jail.3 0 Here, the question is whether
Bradford is entitled to credit toward the completion of his sentence
the approximate 2,200 days between the initial date in which he was
scheduled to voluntarily surrender3 ' and the date the BOP actually
designated for his voluntary surrender.3 2
21. Id. at 851.
22. Id. at 850.
23. Id. at 851.
24. Id. at 850.
25. Id. at 851.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 852.
28. Bradford v. Rivera, No. 9:11-462-RBH-BM, 2011 WL 5827788, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 14,
2011), report and recommendation adopted by No. 9:11-cv-00462-RBH, 2011 WL 5827601
(D.S.C. Nov. 18, 2011).
29. Id.
30. Id. at *3
31. See id. at *2 (asserting that the date for voluntary surreunder should have been desig-
nated August 27, 2002).
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After exhausting all of his administrative remedies, Bradford filed a
writ of habeas corpus on February 25, 2011, in the United States Dis-
trict Court of South Carolina seeking credit for the six-year time pe-
riod he spent at liberty. United States Magistrate Judge Bristow
Marchant issued a Report and Recommendation on October 14, 2011,
stating that Bradford's claim should be dismissed because he failed to
establish that he was entitled to any credit while out on bond. 4
On November 18, 2011, United States District Court Judge R.
Bryan Harwell adopted the Report and Recommendation of Judge
Marchant, and subsequently dismissed Bradford's claim with
prejudice. The reasoning behind the court's decision will be discussed
in greater length in section VII.A of this article. For now, we turn to
the statutory provisions that generally govern the awarding of prior
sentence credit.
III. STATUTORY SENTENCE COMPUTATION
In the federal criminal justice system, the method by which a defen-
dant's sentence may be adjusted based on credit has been largely set
by legislation." Since the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 6 abolished
parole, 3  defendants may receive credit only in carefully circumscribed
situations, such as their good behavior while incarcerated. Under 28
U.S.C. § 2241,"3 a habeas corpus petition is appropriate when a pris-
oner challenges the computation or execution of a federal sentence 4 0
and has exhausted the administrative remedy process. 4 1 Generally,
the commencement of a federal prisoner's sentence is governed by 18
33. Bradford v. Rivera, No. 9:11-462-RBH-BM, 2011 WL 5827788, at *1-3 (D.S.C. Oct. 14,
2011), report and recommendation adopted by No. 9:11-cv-00462-RBH, 2011 WL 5827601
(D.S.C. Nov. 18, 2011).
34. Id. at *4.
35. See infra notes 41-43.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (2012).
37. See id. § 3624(a) (stating that a prisoner is released at "the expiration of the prisoner 's
term of imprisonment, less any time credited" as provided in § 3624(b)).
38. Id. § 3624(b) (allowing credit toward the service of a sentence for satisfactory behavior).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) (providing that "[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted by the
Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respec-
tive jurisdictions.").
40. See United States v. Little, 392 F.3d 671, 679 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing In re Vial, 115 F.3d
1192, 1194 n.5 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc)).
41. See United States v. Bradford, 623 F. Supp. 2d 849, 854-55 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (holding
that if "there is statutory authority for awarding defendant credit toward ... his sentence . . . he
must first seek relief from the BOP and exhaust any available administrative remedies before
seeking judicial review of the BOP's determination on this point.") (citing United States v. Wil-
son, 503 U.S. 329, 334-36 (1992)).
6
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U.S.C. § 3585(a), while any credit for prior custody is governed by
18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).
To receive credit toward a federal sentence, the defendant must
have been in official detention4 4 before the commencement of the
sentence.' While the execution of a defendant's sentence and the
computation of jail time is an administrative function of the Attorney
General, this task has been delegated to the BOP.4 6 The BOP is
tasked with determining whether a defendant is entitled to receive any
credit for previous jail time and calculating when a sentence termi-
nates based on the actual commencement of the sentence.4 7
Adhering strictly to the statutory language of § 3585, Bradford's
term of imprisonment started when he voluntarily surrendered him-
self to FCI Estill in South Carolina on May 4, 2009. Prior to this date,
Bradford was at liberty and was not in official detention or its
equivalent. While Bradford kept in contact with a Pretrial Services
Officer and remained compliant with all bond conditions, these incon-
veniences do not rise to the level of official detention for purposes of
§ 3585.48 However, this does not mean that Bradford may not be enti-
tled to credit the approximate 2,200 days toward the completion of his
sentence. There are primarily two options available to a defendant in
Bradford's position-either (1) he must bring a due process claim
against the government, or (2) he must bring a claim against the gov-
ernment under the doctrine of credit for time spent erroneously at
liberty. The two approaches addressing this issue are considered in
turn.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) (2012) ("A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the
date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to
commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be
served.").
43. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2012) ("A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a
term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sen-
tence commences- (1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or (2) as a
result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the
offense for which the sentence was imposed; that has not been credited against another
sentence.").
44. "Official detention.' See United States v. Insley, 927 F.2d 185, 186 (4th Cir. 1991) (quot-
ing United States v. Woods, 888 F.2d 653, 655 (10th Cir. 1989) (providing that "official deten-
tion" has been defined as "imprisonment in a place of confinement, not stipulations or
conditions imposed upon a person not subject to full physical incarceration."); see also Randall v.
Whelan, 938 F.2d 522, 526 (4th Cir.1991) (declining to credit against a term of imprisonment any
time spent in a community confinement center); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995) (holding
that time spent at a community treatment center did not constitute official detention).
45. See Binford v. United States, 436 F.3d 1252, 1254 (10th Cir. 2006).
46. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a)).
47. Id.
48. See supra notes 31-32.
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IV. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE APPROACH
The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution guarantees that
-[n]o person shall ... be deprived of . . . liberty . . . without due
process of law . . ."4 A defendant may seek to bring a claim that re-
incarceration after time spent at liberty violates the basic guarantees
of due process afforded by the U.S. Constitution.5 o As noted by Su-
preme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, "Freedom from imprisonment
lies at the heart of the 'liberty' that the Constitution protects.""' Typi-
cally, federal courts have taken two different approaches in their re-
view of due process claims made in these instances-the waiver
theory52 or the two-part test,53 which was established by the U.S. Su-
preme Court in County of Sacramento v. Lewis.
A. The Waiver of Jurisdiction Theory
Several courts, including the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, have
accepted a "waiver of jurisdiction" theory in situations involving the
re-incarceration of a defendant after time spent erroneously at lib-
erty.55 This theory differs from the doctrine of time spent at liberty
because it prevents authorities from re-incarcerating a prisoner even if
that prisoner still has time remaining on his or her sentence.5 6
49. U.S. CONs I. amend. V; see also U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § I ('[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.")
50. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998) (internal citations omit-
ted) (providing that due process aims to protect individuals from arbitrary actions taken by the
government that effectively deny an individual procedural fairness or result in the government
exerting power without any reasonable justification., and noting the dual purpose of due process
in ensuring procedural and substantive fairness).
51. Sniniii N BRmivR, MAKING OUR Di;M(oRACY WORK: A Jui)(in's Viiw 103 (2010).
52. See infra Part IV.A.
53. See infra Part IV.B.
54. Cnry. of Sacremento, 523 U.S. 833.
55. See Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868, 873-74 (9th Cir. 1982) (concluding re-incarcera-
tion of prisoner after mistakenly discharged on parole would be inconsistent with fundamental
principles of liberty and justice and consequently violate due process); Shelton v. Ciccone, 578
F.2d 1241, 1245-46 (8th Cir. 1978) (remanding case upon finding defendant's allegations-that
the government knew of his whereabouts but either purposefully or out of extreme negligence
failed to execute his sentence for seven years-sufficient to suggest defendant had been denied
due process); Piper v. Estelle. 485 F. 2d 245, 246 (5th Cir. 1973) (denying relief based on the facts
of the case but recognizing that the re-incarceration of a defendant upon a showing of affirma-
tive wrongdoing or gross negligence on the part of the state would be inconsistent with the
fundamental principles of liberty and justice); Shields v. Beto, 370 F.2d 1003, 1006 (5th Cir. 1967)
(holding re-incarceration of defendant after lapse of twenty-eight years would be inconsistent
with fundamental principles of liberty and justice and violate due process); see also Bonebrake v.
Norris, 417 F.3d 938, 943 (8th Cir. 2005) (denying due process claim because four-year delay in
executing sentence was not conscience-shocking).
56. See Shields, 370 F.2d at 1006.
8
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However, in 1999, the Fourth Circuit addressed the waiver of juris-
diction theory in Hawkins v. Freeman." There, the court held that
such an approach was not appropriate to use when reviewing a chal-
lenger's substantive due process claim." According to the Fourth
Circuit:
In finding a substantive due process violation on that basis [the waiver
of jurisdiction theory], it either assumes that substantive due process
protects against any sufficiently arbitrary act of government, without
regard to the existence of any affected liberty interest, or that a consti-
tutionally protected liberty interest can be created simply by the ex-
pectation-inducing conduct of state officials. Neither assumption is
valid under contemporary substantive due process jurisprudence. 9
Because the waiver of jurisdiction theory "runs afoul of both [of]
these limiting principles of contemporary substantive due process
law," the court found its application to be unacceptable.6 0
B. The Two-Part Lewis Test
More recently, courts have reviewed substantive due process chal-
lenges under the two-part Lewis test.6 1 Under this approach, the chal-
lenger must first show that the government's conduct "shock[s] the
contemporary conscience."6 2 The challenger must then show that the
conduct violates a fundamental right or liberty that is implicit in the
challenger's right to due process.6 3 A substantive due process claim
will only be upheld if the challenger has met both of these require-
ments.6 4 Thus, a challenger must show both that re-incarceration
shocks the conscience and that re-incarceration violates a fundamen-
tal right or liberty.
Courts often disagree over whether a prisoner's liberty interest is
fundamental and thus subject to due process protection.6 5 In Hawkins
57. Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
58. Id. at 743-45, 749.
59. Id. at 749.
60. Id. at 750.
61. See, e.g., Bonebrake v. Norris, 417 F.3d 938, 942-43 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying the Lewis
test to determine whether the state's four-year delay in seeking to execute a sentence violated
substantive due process); Hawkins, 195 F.3d at 738-46. (using the Lewis test to determine
whether re-incarcerating the appellant after he was mistakenly released on parole would violate
due process).
62. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 & n.8 (1998).
63. Id.
64. See Hawkins, 195 F.3d at 738 (stating that the conscience-shocking standard is the
threshold test of culpability, and that if conduct does not meet this test, the due process claim
fails while if conduct does meet this test, the court must determine what level of protection is
afforded to the liberty interest in question).
65. Compare Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868, 871, 873-74 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that re-
incarcerating petitioner after period of erroneous release on parole would violate due process),
and Sanchez v. Warden, 329 F. Supp. 2d 200, 206 (D. N.H. 2004) (recognizing that denial of
2012] 9
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v. Freeman, the Fourth Circuit rejected the waiver of jurisdiction the-
ory for due process claims6 6 and instead applied the two-part Lewis
test.67 The court found that delayed incarceration in general is not a
unique occurrence and that the two-year delay in re-incarcerating the
petitioner in Hawkins did not shock the conscience.68  Additionally,
the court held that the petitioner's asserted "right to be free from un-
just incarceration" 6 9 was not a right or liberty interest that could be
declared a "fundamental" one that is "objectively, deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition."" Having found that the two-year
delay did not shock the conscience, and that there was no fundamen-
tal right or liberty interest implicated by re-incarceration, the court
denied the petitioner's due process claim.
In a dissenting opinion in Hawkins, Judge Francis Murnaghan found
the "shock the conscience" inquiry to be inappropriate in a case in-
volving the non-discretionary application of a legislative policy, and
provided that instead the analysis of the petitioner's claim should be
conducted under the framework of Washington v. Glucksberg.7 2
Judge Murnaghan also stated that Fourth Circuit precedent recog-
nized the defendant's interest in the finality of his sentence.7 3 Accord-
credit from time at liberty that would affect duration of prisoner's confinement and require him
to serve sentence in installments may implicate due process protection), with Hawkins , 195 F.3d
at 742-48 (asserting that erroneous release is too common to be considered conscience-shocking
and declaring that the right of an erroneously released prisoner's continued freedom is not
fundamental).
66. Hawkins, 195 F.3d at 738.
67. Id. at 741-48, 750.
68. Id. at 745-48; see also Bonebrake v. Norris, 417 F.3d 938, 943 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding
that a four-year delay in incarcerating the petitioner did not shock the conscience).
69. Hawkins, 195 F.3d at 747 (citing Brief for Appellant at 10, Hawkins, 195 F.3d 732, No.
96-7539, 1998 WL 34101969 at *1).
70. Hawkins, 195 F.3d at 747 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720703
(1997).)).
71. Id. at 750.
72. Id. at 753-60 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (for the sake of argument the dissent did apply
the"shock the conscience" analysis to the government's conduct and found that the "conduct
was sufficiently egregious so as to shock the contemporary conscience.") .
73. Id. at 754 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Lundien, 769 F.2d 981, 987
(4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Cook, 890 F.2d 672, 675 (4th Cir. 1989)). A number of other
courts, both at the federal and state level, have recognized the due process right set out in
Lundien and Cook. Most of these courts have held for the government on the facts. None of
these courts, however, has questioned the legitimacy of the due process principle set out in our
prior decisions. See DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32, 35-36 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding re-incarcera-
tion violated the Due Process Clause and that fundamental fairness prohibited the State from re-
imposing defendant's original life term); see also United States v. Watkins, 147 F.3d 1294, 1298
n. 5 (11th Cir. 1998) ("We are mindful that a defendant's due process rights may be violated
'when a sentence is enhanced after the defendant has served so much of his sentence that his
expectations as to its finality have crystallized and it would be fundamentally unfair to defeat
them."') (quoting Lundien, 769 F.2d at 987); United States v. Tolson, 935 F. Supp. 17, 21 (D.D.C.
1996) ("[T]he Due Process Clause prohibits enhancing a defendant's sentence after he has
served so much of it that his expectations have crystallized."); United States v. Davis, 112 F.3d
10
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ing to the dissent in Hawkins, once a defendant is released, he has a
reasonable expectation of continued freedom that crystallizes over
time.7 4 "Once crystallized, that reasonable expectation to freedom is
a legitimate liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.""
According to the dissent, the government could not then satisfy a
strict scrutiny analysis."
While Bradford's six-year delay might rise to the level of shocking
the community conscience, it is highly doubtful that he would success-
fully satisfy the second prong of the Lewis test. Even if Bradford ar-
gued that his expectation of freedom had crystallized after six years at
liberty in accordance with the Hawkins dissent, the Hawkins majority
opinion would ultimately defeat the claim.
There is, however, another challenge to re-incarceration that Brad-
ford may be able to pursue. Although the likelihood of success is ex-
tremely low, if Bradford is denied proper medical treatment of his
brain cancer while incarcerated, he might attempt to challenge the re-
incarceration on the grounds that such an act would infringe upon his
right to the personal control of his medical treatment."
V. THE DOCTRINE OF CREDIT FOR TIME SPENT ERRONEOUSLY A'
LIBERTY APPROACH
The traditional rule applied by courts in similar instances was
harsh-"no matter how long a defendant spent at liberty, no matter
how negligent the government had been, and regardless of whether
the defendant brought the issue to the attention of the authorities, the
defendant would be required to serve his full sentence."" While
Bradford may not have any statutory or constitutional authority to
118, 123 (3d Cir.1997); United States v. Campbell, 985 F. Supp. 158, 160-61 (D.D.C.1997), affd,
172 F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir.1998); Thayer v. United States, 937 F. Supp. 662, 667 (E.D. Mich. 1996);
Santiago v. United States, 954 F. Supp. 1201, 1203 (N.D. Ohio 1996); United States v. Crowder,
947 F. Supp. 1183, 1193 (E.D.Tenn.1996); Merritt v. United States, 930 F. Supp. 1109, 1115 (E.D.
N.C. 1996); State v. Humes, 581 N.W.2d 317, 321 (Minn. 1998); Austin v. State, 663 A.2d 62, 64-
65 (Me. 1995); Nelson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 835, 839 (1991).
74. Hawkins, 195 F.3d at 756 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 757 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (for a move comprehensive analysis of why the
government's interests do not survive strict scrutiny, see the panel opinion at Hawkins v. Free-
man, 166 F.3d 267, 279-80 (4th Cir. 1999)).
77. See generally Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (recog-
nizing the "principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment.").
78. Gabriel J. Chin, Getting Out of Jail Free: Sentence Credit for Periods of Mistaken Lib-
ertv. 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 403 (1996); see United States ex rel. Mayer v. Loisel, 25 F.2d 300, 301
(5th Cir. 1928); Morris v. United States, 185 F. 73, 76 (8th Cir. 1911) (explaining that an offer to
surrender in accordance with judgment, which was refused by the marshal, did not constitute
service of sentence); Leonard v. Rodda, 5 App. D.C. 256, 274-75 (D.C. 1895) (denying credit
based on erroneous release).
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support the claim that he is entitled to approximately 2,200 days of
credit toward the reduction of his sentence, the First, Second,"'
Third,' Fifth,8 2 Sixth," Seventh,8 4 Eighth, Ninth,86 Tenth, and
Eleventh8 1 Circuits have all recognized the "rule" or "doctrine" of
credit for time spent at liberty as an exception to the traditional rule. 9
Generally, under this doctrine, courts may award the defendant
credit toward his outstanding federal sentence for the time he spent at
liberty through no fault of his own.90 Unlike the due process excep-
tion, the doctrine of credit for time spent erroneously at liberty only
reduces the prisoner's sentence.91 It does not completely discharge
the defendant. 9 2 Credit for time spent at liberty is not a novel con-
cept, and its origins can be traced back to the Tenth Circuit's 1930
opinion in White v. Pearlman.93 In White, which will be discussed in
greater length later in Part V.1, the Tenth Circuit emphasized that
prisoners have certain rights, including the right to serve a continuous
sentence free from interruptions.9 4
However, there is disagreement about whether the doctrine applies
when there is merely a delay in the commencement of the sentence, or
whether it applies only in those instances where the sentence is inter-
rupted. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have found that the doctrine
79. See Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 90 (1st Cir. 2009).
80. See Kiendra v. Hadden, 763 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cii. 1985); United States v. Greenhaus, 89
F.2d 634, 635 (2d Cir. 1937) (per curiam) (Learned Hand, Augustus Hand, and Harrie Chase,
i1.) (awarding credit for the period of erroneous relief).
81. See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314-19 (3d Cir. 2007).
82. See Leggett v. Fleming, 380 F.3d 232, 234-35 (5th Cir. 2004).
83. See United States v. Croft, 450 F.2d 1094, 1095-99 (6th Cir. 1971).
84. See Dunne v. Keohane, 14 F.3d 335, 336-37 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1149
(1994).
85. See United States v. Downey, 469 F.2d 1030, 1031-32 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
86. See Clark v. Floyd, 80 F.3d 371, 372-74 (9th Cir. 1996); Smith v. Swope, 91 F.2d 260, 261-
62 (9th Cir. 1937).
87. See White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir. 1930).
88. See United States v. Barfield, 396 F.3d 1144, 1147 (11th Cir. 2005).
89. Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 315-22 (3d Cir. 2007) (engaging in a comprehensive
summary of cases recognizing the applicability of the doctrine); see also Application of Nelson,
434 F.2d 748, 749-50 (8th Cir. 1970) vacated, Nelson v. United States, 402 U.S. 1006 (1971),
remanded to Application of Nelson, 445 F.2d 631, 632 (8th Cir. 1971) (illustrating the position of
the United States Department to read the statute liberally rather than literally as they agreed with
the defendant that it would be inequitable to deny credit to a prisoner whose federal sentence
never commenced, for purposes of the statute, because he was too poor to post bail for a state
conviction which turned out to be invalid).
90. See infra notes 100-179 and accompanying text (explaining the doctrine of credit for
time spent erroneously at liberty as applied by a majority of United States Courts of Appeals).
91. See Shields v. Beto, 370 F.2d 1003, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1967).
92. Id. (recognizing the general outcome of a due process violation, while keeping in mind
that the likely effect in Mr. Bradford's case would be release from custody given the length of
time that may be awarded for time spent at liberty.).
93. White v. Pearlman, 42 F2dF.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1930).
94. Id. at 789.
[Vol. 35:1
12
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 1 [2012], Art. 3
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol35/iss1/3
2012] FOURTH CIRCUIT 13
only applies in situations where the prisoner was erroneously released
after serving some portion of the original sentence. 5 Other courts,
including the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, have implicitly or
expressly held that a prisoner can be afforded credit under the doc-
trine regardless of whether the sentence has actually begun. 6
The following sub-sections briefly review the varying tests em-
ployed by other circuits when applying the doctrine of credit for time
spent erroneously at liberty. While the Fourth Circuit has never ad-
dressed the applicability and scope of the doctrine, the Third Circuit
has observed, at a minimum, that "[n]early every court to have consid-
ered the rule of credit for time at liberty has required that the govern-
ment's actions in releasing or failing to incarcerate the prisoner be
negligent.""
A. The First Circuit
In 2009, the First Circuit addressed the doctrine of credit for time
spent erroneously at liberty for the first time in Espinoza v. Sabol."
Although acknowledging the applicability of the doctrine, the court
ultimately chose not to specifically define its contours or application.99
The court, however, discussed the relevance of considering both the
government's negligence and the need for the defendant to have clean
hands in order to receive credit while at liberty."o Unlike the Third
95. Leggett v. Fleming, 380 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 2004) (asserting that delay in the com-
mencement of a sentence does not constitute service of that sentence); United States v. Barfield,
396 F.3d 1144, 1145-48 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant was not entitled to credit for an
eight-year delay where defendant's sentenced had not commenced). The Eleventh Circuit relied
on past binding precedent from the Fifth Circuit in reaching its decision in Barfield. See Bonner
v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (decisions by the former
Fifth Circuit issued before October 1, 1981, are binding as precedent in the Eleventh Circuit).
96. Kiendra v. Hadden, 763 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that the federal sentence
began to run on the date ordered even though the appellant was never taken into custody);
Dunne v. Keohane, 14 F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[G]overnment is not permitted to delay
the expiration of the sentence either by postponing the commencement of the sentence or by
releasing the prisoner for a time and the reimprisoning him"); Clark v. Floyd, 80 F.3d 371, 373-
74 (9th Cir. 1996) (granting credit for time at liberty to a habeas petitioner whose sentence was
merely delayed). Compare Smith v. Swope, 91 F.2d 260, 261 (9th Cir. 1937) (while defendant was
in the custody of the marshal at the time of sentence, he never was actually delivered to a peni-
tentiary to begin service of his sentence), with Swope, 91 F.2d at 262-63 (Haney, J., dissenting)
(arguing that credit was unavailable because the defendant had never been received by the
prison). See also, Chin, supra note 78, at 421 ("The key to the doctrine of credit for time at
liberty is disobedience of a court order, not interruption of a criminal sentence.").
97. Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 320 (3rd Cir. 2007).
98. Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83 (1st Cir. 2009).
99. Id. at 90 ("[Wie need not define the outer reaches of the doctrine.").
100. Id. (T he degree of negligence and, indeed, whether there was intentional error by the
government may be highly relevant considerations . . ").
13
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Circuit's burden-shifting test,"o' the First Circuit requires that the de-
fendant bear the burden of proof under the doctrine. 10 2
Assuming that the government was negligent, the court reviewed
the defendant's actions that led to his release.10 3 In fact, the court's
analysis seemed to place the clean hands requirement as the initial
threshold analysis for determining whether to award sentence credit.
Relying exclusively on the common-law requirement of clean
hands,'0 4 the court held that the defendant was not entitled to credit
because his liberty was attributed solely to his escape from his halfway
house.10 5  According to the court, "A doctrine meant to protect
against government abuses of prisoners through cat and mouse games
of imprisonment cannot be turned into a game of catch me if you
can."106
B. The Second Circuit
In Kiendra v. Hadden,07 adhering to the doctrine s core principle
that the government is not entitled to delay the expiration of a pris-
oner's sentence, the Second Circuit credited a defendant for the time
period between his date of release from state penitentiary and the
time he was finally taken into federal custody to serve his federal
sentence.10s
In Kiendra, the district court sentenced the defendant to three years
of federal imprisonment slated to start once the defendant was re-
leased from state custody."" On September 16, 1981, the defendant
was released from the Rhode Island Adult Correctional Institution,
but the federal government did not assume custody." 0 Approxi-
mately one month later, the defendant pled guilty to an unrelated
state charge and was sentenced to a four-year prison term to be served
in a federal institution."' The state sentence was scheduled to run
concurrently with his federal sentence.' 12 Again, the federal marshals
took no action." In fact, no action was taken until February 17, 1984,
101. Vega, 493 F.3d at 319.
102. Espinoza, 558 F.3d at 89-90.
103. Id. at 90.
104. Id. ("At common law, an escaped prisoner could not have received credit for the time
he was at large, and there must not have been any contributing fault on his part.") (citing White
v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir. 1930)).
105. Espinoza, 558 F.3d at 90 ("But for his escape, the issue would not have arisen.").
106. Id.
107. Kiendra v. Hadden, 763 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.1985).
108. Id. at 73.
109. Id. at 70.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 70-71.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 71.
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when the defendant completed his state sentence and federal marshals
took him into custody and later transported him to a federal correc-
tional facility.'"
Relying on the opinions issued by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits," 5
the Second Circuit held that the defendant was entitled to credit even
though he was not placed in federal custody until February 1984.6
According to the court, a defendant's sentence begins to run on the
date the federal court directed at sentencing.' 17
C. The Third Circuit
In Vega v. United States,"' the Third Circuit engaged in a compre-
hensive survey of courts confronting the issue of the doctrine of credit
for time spent erroneously at liberty."' 9 After reviewing decisions is-
sued by those courts, the Third Circuit adopted a two-prong test to
determine whether the defendant is entitled to credit for time spent at
liberty. 2 0 First, the petitioner's habeas petition must "contain facts
that demonstrate that he has been released despite having unserved
time remaining on his sentence."121 Once this prong is satisfied,
"[T]he burden shifts to the government to prove either: (1) that there
was no negligence on the part of the imprisoning sovereign, or (2) that
the prisoner obtained or retained his liberty through his own ef-
forts."' 2 2 If the government fails to establish either of these, the de-
fendant will be granted relief under the doctrine.123
The court reasoned that the burden-shifting approach gave effect to
the language of the habeas framework.' 2 4 Thus, the test places "the
initial burden on the prisoner to show his right to relief, which he does
by indicating that his right to serve his sentence continuously, has
been denied him." 25 "The test then requires the court to grant the
petition unless the respondent government can 'show cause why the
114. Id.
115. See id. at 72-73 (citing Smith v. Swope, 91 F.2d 260, 262 (9th Cir. 1937); White v. Pearl-
man, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir. 1930)).
116. Kiendra, 763 F.2d at 71-73 ("It is our conclusion that where a prisoner is discharged
from a penal institution. without any contributing fault on his part, and without violation of
conditions of parole, that his sentence continues to run while he is at liberty.") (citing White v.
Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir. 1930)).
117. Kiendra, 763 F.2d at 73.
118. Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2007).
119. Id. at 315-22.
120. Id. at 319 ; see generally Wall, supra note 3, at 414-17 (providing an argument in favor of
a totality of the circumstances approach, rather than the Third Circuit's two-prong test).
121. Vega, 493 F.3d at 319.
122. Id.
123. Id.
1-4. Id. at 319-20.
125. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2012)).
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writ should not be granted."'1 2 6 According to the court, "The burden
shifting scheme also places the burden on the party that has greater
access to documents tending to prove a lack of governmental negli-
gence or prisoner fault." 2 7
D. The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit has declined to apply the doctrine to instances
where there is only a delay in the commencement of a prisoner's sen-
tence.128 In Leggett v. Fleming,12 9 the court acknowledged that the
Ninth Circuit has held that a defendant is "entitled to a credit against
his sentence for time spent erroneously at liberty even though he had
not yet begun his federal sentence because he was released through
the inadvertence of agents and through no fault of his own."13 0 How-
ever, prior Fifth Circuit precedent has held that "a prisoner is not enti-
tled to a credit when there is merely a delay in the execution of one's
sentence.""'3  Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit declined the defendant's
argument to adopt the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit and instead
chose to follow its own precedent.13 2
E. The Sixth Circuit
In United States v. Croft,"' the Sixth Circuit seemingly endorsed the
applicability of the doctrine when it relied on the Ninth Circuit's opin-
ion in Smith v. Swope"' to credit the defendant's federal sentence.13 5
However, the court did not provide any further guidance on the appli-
cation or scope of the doctrine. In Croft, the defendant was always
under some form of government custody, whether state or federal.13 6
He was not "at liberty" as typically observed in other cases.' 3 7 The
court held that the prisoner's federal sentence began to run from the
date of the federal court's order of commitment regardless of the pris-
oner first being held in county jail and subsequently transported to a
126. Id. at 320 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2012)).
127. Id.
128. Leggett v. Fleming, 380 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 2004).
129. Id. at 232.
130. Id. at 235 (citing Clark v. Floyd, 80 F.3d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1996)).
131. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Mayer v. Loisel, 25 F.2d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 1928); Scott v.
United States, 434 F.2d 11, 23 (5th Cir. 1970)).
132. Id.
133. United States v. Croft, 450 F.2d 1094 (6th Cir. 1971).
134. Smith v. Swope, 91 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1937).
135. Croft, 450 F.2d at 1099 (pointing to Smith as "the authority that guides determination in
this case," finding that the defendant was entitled to credit against his federal sentence for time
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state prison.' Thus, this case illustrates the core principle upon
which the doctrine rests-the government is not permitted to delay
the expiration of a prisoner's sentence.13 1
F. The Seventh Circuit
In Dunne v. Keohane,14 0 the Seventh Circuit simply and succinctly
stated that when the prisoner is not at fault for his time at liberty
under the common law, "The government is not permitted to delay
the expiration of the sentence either by postponing the commence-
ment of the sentence or by releasing the prisoner for a time and then
reimprisoning him."' 4 ' Addressing the need for rehabilitation, the
Seventh Circuit further explained the core purpose of the doctrine:
"The government is not permitted to play cat and mouse with the pris-
oner, delaying indefinitely the expiration of his debt to society and his
reintegration into the free community."1 4 2
G. The Eighth Circuit
In United States v. Downey,1' the Eighth Circuit granted credit to
the defendant's federal criminal sentence.' Much like the circum-
stances presented in the Sixth Circuit's Croftl4 5 decision, the defen-
dant in Downey sought credit for time spent while he was in custody
of the government, and not at "liberty." 4 6 The court held that a crim-
inal sentence starts on the date that the defendant is taken into cus-
tody. 14 7 Accordingly, the court granted the defendant credit for time
spent in state custody before the commencement of his federal sen-
tence.14 8 Like the Sixth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit Downey decision
illustrates that doctrine's underlying principle-the government is not
permitted to delay the expiration of a prisoner's sentence.149
138. Id.
139. Cf Dunne v. Keohane, 14 F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 1994).
140. Dunne v. Keohane, 14 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 1994).
141. Id. at 336 (See, e.g., United States v. Melody, 863 F.2d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 1988); Cox v.
United States cx rel. Arron, 551 F.2d 1096, 1099 (7th Cir. 1977); Shields v. Beto, 370 F.2d 1003,
1006 (5th Cir. 1967); White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1930); Ex parte Eley, 130 P. 821
(Okla. Crim. App. 1913); In re Strickler, 33 P. 620 (Kan. 1893)).
142. Id.
143. United States v. Downey, 469 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1972).
144. Id. at 1032.
145. United States v. Croft, 450 F.2d 1094 (6th Cir. 1971).
146. Downey, 469 F.2d at 1031.
147. Id. at 1032 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3568).
148. Id.
149. Cf. Dunne, 14 F.3d at 336 (7th Cir. 1994).
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H. The Ninth Circuit
In Smith v. Swope,15 0 the Ninth Circuit recognized that a delay in
the commencement of a prisoner's sentence, whose liberty was the
result of government error, should not be borne by the prisoner.5 1 In
Swope, the marshal, charged with transporting the prisoner to a fed-
eral correctional institution, failed to do as instructed.15 2 When the
prisoner was finally brought into federal custody, he filed a writ of
habeas corpus contending that he was being unlawfully deprived of his
liberty.' 5  Agreeing with the prisoner, the Ninth Circuit aptly stated:
The least to which a prisoner is entitled is the execution of the sen-
tence of the court to whose judgment he is duly subject. If a ministe-
rial officer, such as a marshal, charged with the duty to execute the
court's orders, fails to carry out such orders, that failure cannot be
charged up against the prisoner. The prisoner is entitled to serve his
time promptly if such is the judgment imposed, and he must be
deemed to be serving it from the date he is ordered to serve it and is in
the custody of the marshal under the commitment, if, without his fault,
the marshal neglects to place him in the proper custody. Any other
holding would give the marshal, a ministerial officer, power more arbi-
trary and capricious than any known in the law. A prisoner sentenced
for one year might thus be required to wait forty under the shadow of
his unserved sentence before it pleases the marshal to incarcerate him.
Such authority is not even granted to courts of justice, let alone their
ministerial officers. Citation of authority is hardly needed to establish
so elementary a proposition.15 4
The Ninth Circuit further espoused upon the liberty doctrine in
United States v. Martinez.1 15 According to the court:
Under the doctrine of credit for time at liberty, a convicted person is
entitled to credit against his sentence for the time he was erroneously
at liberty provided there is a showing of simple or mere negligence on
behalf of the government and provided the delay in execution of sen-
tence was through no fault of his own.'56
Unlike the Third and Fifth Circuits, the Ninth Circuit held that negli-
gence by any governmental entity is sufficient to allow credit from
time spent at liberty.9 7
150. Smith v. Swope, 91 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1937).
151. Id. at 262.
152. Id. at 261.
153. Id. at 260-61.
154. Id. at 262 (citing In re Jennings, 118 F. 479, 481 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1902); Albori v. United
States, 67 F.2d 4. 6 (9th Cir. 1933); White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir. 1930)) (empha-
sis added).
155. United States v. Martinez, 837 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1988).
156. Id. at 865; see also Green v. Christiansen, 732 F.2d 1397, 1400 (9th Cir. 1984).
157. Compare Clark N. Floyd, 80 F.3d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1996), with Vega v. United States,
493 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2007), and Leggett v. Fleming, 380 F.3d 232, 235-36 (5th Cir. 2004).
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In 1996, the Ninth Circuit returned to the application of the doc-
trine to an erroneously released prisoner. 58 In Clark v. Floyd,59 the
commencement of the prisoner's sentence was delayed "through the
inadvertence of agents of the government."16 0 Relying on its opinion
in Smith v. Swope, the Ninth Circuit held that the prisoner was enti-
tled to credit for time he spent erroneously at liberty even though he
had yet to serve any portion of his federal sentence.1 6'
1. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth's Circuit's opinion in White v. Pearlman"' is the seminal
case applying the doctrine of credit for time spent at liberty, cited by
almost every court addressing the doctrine.'6 3 In White, David Pearl-
man was sentenced to a five-year term of imprisonment in March
1925.164 Approximately one year later, Pearlman was informed that
his sentence would expire in July 1926.165 Despite expressing his con-
cern that a mistake had been made, Pearlman was released and suc-
cessfully re-established himself in society.16 6 More than two years
later, Pearlman voluntarily surrendered himself to authorities after
being advised that he was required to serve the remainder of his sen-
tence. 6 7 In seeking credit for the time he was at liberty, the district
court granted Pearlman's order for a writ of habeas corpus and the
warden appealed.'16
In affirming the district court's order, the Tenth Circuit held that
prisoners have some rights, including the right to serve a continuous
sentence.16 9 The court recognized that "a prisoner should have the
chance to re-establish himself and live down his past," and held that
"where a prisoner is discharged from a penal institution, without any
contributing fault on his part, and without violation of conditions of
158. See Clark v. Floyd, 80 F.3d 371 (9th Cir. 1996).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 374 (internal citation omitted).
161. Id.
162. White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1930).
163. Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 88 (1st Cii. 2009); United States v. Greenhaus, 89 F.2d
634, 635 (2d Cir. 1937); Kiendra v. Hadden, 763 F.2d 69, 72-3 (2d Cir. 1985); Vega v. United
States, 493 F.3d 310, 315 (3d Cir. 2007); Dunne v. Keohane, 14 F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 1994);
Smith v. Swope, 91 F.2d 260, 262 (9th Cir. 1937); United States v. Martinez, 837 F.2d 861, 864
(9th Cir. 1988); Clark v. Floyd, 80 F.3d 371, 375 (9th Cir. 1996) (J. Fernandez, dissenting);
Weekes v. Fleming, 301 F.3d 1175,1178-80 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Barfield, 396 F.3d
1144. 1147 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Merritt, 478 F. Supp. 804, 806 (D.D.C. 1979).
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parole, that his sentence continues to run while he is at liberty." 7 o If
the prisoner procured his release by escape, or violated conditions of
parole, no credit should be applied toward the sentence. '7  However,
the court chose not to answer the question of whether a prisoner, who
knows a mistake is being made and says nothing, is at fault.17 2
J. The Eleventh Circuit
Adhering to binding precedent from the former Fifth Circuit,'7 3 the
Eleventh Circuit held in United States v. Barfieldl74 that the doctrine
does not apply when the commencement of a prisoner's sentence is
merely delayed.'7  In support of this conclusion, the court referenced
the Fifth Circuit's Leggett v. Fleming decision. 176 The court noted that
the Fifth Circuit also relied upon the same prior precedent in reaching
the same result. 7 7
Appearing in a footnote, the court alluded to the requirement for a
defendant to have clean hands, stating that the court's decision in
Barfield is "peculiarly appropriate in those cases where the convicted
party had himself been instrumental in causing the delay in execu-
tion."' 7  Additionally, the court recognized that the Ninth Circuit has
applied the doctrine to cases where a defendant's sentence has been
delayed (which was also conspicuously contained in a footnote). 7 9
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193 (1923)).
172. White, 42 F.2d, at 789.
173. In Bonner v. Citv of Prichard, the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all
decision of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30,
1981. 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
174. United States v. Barfield, 396 F.3d 1144 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Little v. Holder, 396
F.3d 1319 1322 (11th Cir. 2005) (declining to award credit by holding that a mere delay of a
federal sentence falls within the holding of Barfield).
175. Barfield, 396 F.3d at 1147-48 (relying on Scott v. United States, 434 F.2d 11, 23 (5th Cir.
1970) ("This Court holds that the mere lapse of time that occurred here [27 months], without
petitioner undergoing any actual imprisonment to which he was sentenced . . does not consti-
tute service of that sentence, and this sentence remains subject to be executed, notwithstanding
the delay in executing it.") and United States ex rel. Mayer v. Loisel, 25 F.2d 300, 301 (5th Cir.
1928) ("Mere lapse of time without the appellant undergoing the imprisonment to which she was
sentenced did not constitute service of the sentence, which remained subject to be enforced
176. Id. at 1148 (citing Leggett v. Fleming, 380 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2004)).
177. Id. ("Leggett similarly relied on Scott and Mayer-precedent binding our Court as well as
the Fifth Circuit-in holding prisoners cannot receive credit for time at liberty when their
sentences have only been delayed.")
178. Id. at 1147-48 n.3 (quoting Scott v. United States, 434 F.2d 11, 23 (5th Cir. 1970)).
179. Id. at 1148 n.4 (citing Clark v. Floyd, 80 F.3d 371, 373-74 (9th Cir. 1996); Smith v.
Swope, 91 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1937)).
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VI. A RECOMMENDATlION TIO IHE FOUR I CIRCUIT
A. Considerations of Punishment and Rehabilitation, a Starting
Point for Any Court
First and foremost, a cornerstone of the American criminal justice
system is the concept of rehabilitation."8 o According to classical utili-
tarianism,'8 1 the justification of punishment depends solely on its con-
sequences.1 8 2 And thus "the purpose of all laws is to maximize the net
happiness of society.""' Rehabilitation is a non-classical variety of
utilitarianism.1 8 4 Proponents of this approach "prefer to use the cor-
rectional system to reform the wrongdoer rather than to secure com-
pliance through the fear or 'bad taste' of punishment.""' While
inevitably case specific, methods of rehabilitation may include psychi-
atric care, addiction therapy, or vocational training.18 6
Arguably more important than its retributive' and deterrent' 88
purposes, punishment seeks to rehabilitate the defendant so that, if
released, the defendant will be a positive and contributing member of
society." However, opponents often criticize the need and effective-
ness of rehabilitation by pointing to the results of empirical studies.' 90
Regardless of the skepticism toward general, widespread rehabilita-
tion efforts in federal correctional institutions, the effectiveness of re-
habilitation on a criminal defendant should be considered on a case-
by-case basis. The doctrine of credit for time spent erroneously at
180. See JOSI JA Diu:SSLI R. UNDiRSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 14 (5th ed. 2009).
181. Id. ("Utilitarianism is a form of 'consequentialism.'").
182. Id.
183. Id. (citing Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in Bentham's Works 396, 402 (J.
Bowring ed., 1843)).
184. Id. at 15.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. The theory of retributive punishment provides that "the wrongdoer should be punished,
whether or not it will result in a reduction ol crime." According to a retributivist, Ji]t is morally
fitting that an offender should suffer in proportion to [his] desert or culpable wrongdoing.'" Id.
at 16.
188. Utilitarians also emphasize the importance of deterrence, both general and specific.
According to this approach, by punishing the defendant, the general public will gain awareness
of impermissible behavior and its consequences, and will be deterred from committing like-acts
in the future. In the alternative, specific deterrence applies to the individual defendant. Punish-
ment will deter that defendant from committing future crime. See id. at 15. Of course, it is
possible for one to argue that allowing the government to re-incarcerate a defendant after
spending time erroneously at liberty without credit serves as a strong deterrent both generally
and specifically. The intimidation and fear or threat of future re-incarceration could perceivably
deter both the public and the defendant from committing other crimes.
189. See id. 14-15.
190. Id. at 21 (citing Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison
Reform, 35 PU B. INT. 22 (1974)). But see Robert Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note
of Caution Regarding Sentence Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 243 (1979).
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liberty encapsulates the concept of rehabilitation by prohibiting the
government from delaying the expiration of a prisoner's sentence.19 1
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia's opinion in
United States v. Merrittl9 2 exemplifies the importance of rehabilitation
in the context of a prisoner at liberty. In Merritt, the defendant was
released from state custody but was never taken into federal custody
as a result of governmental negligence.19 3 After his release from state
custody, the defendant was erroneously at liberty for three years. 19 4
During that period, the defendant married, had one natural child and
adopted another child who was partially handicapped, became an ac-
tive member of his local church, and became part owner and vice pres-
ident of a construction company.' 9 The defendant was later arrested
on an outstanding federal detainer, and he began serving his federal
sentence.19 6 Under a number of theories, the defendant sought to ei-
ther vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence.' 9 7
In its decision to vacate and set aside the defendant's sentence, the
district court recognized and applied the doctrine for time spent at
liberty."1 The court stated:
It is well settled that when a prisoner is released prior to service or
expiration of his sentence through no fault or connivance of his own,
and the authorities make no attempt over a prolonged period of time
to reacquire custody over him, he may be given credit for the time
involved, and he will not be required at some later time to serve the
remainder of his sentence. 199
While recognizing the multitude of theoretical bases for reaching this
conclusion, the court addressed several factors that must be consid-
ered in order to grant a defendant relief, including whether the defen-
191. See, e.g., White, 42 F.2d at 789 ("Certainly a prisoner should have his chance to re-
establish himself and live down his past."); Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 318 (3d Cir.
2007) ("A prisoner has a right to ... resettle . . . without the fear that the government, at some
undetermined point in the future will re-incarcerate him."); Dunne v. Keohane, 14 F.3d 335 (7th
Cir. 1994) ("The government is not permitted to play cat and mouse with the prisoner, delaying
indefinitely the expiration of his debt to society and his reintegration into the free community.");
Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing White, 42 F.2d at 789).
192. United States v. Merritt, 478 F. Supp. 804 (D.D.C. 1979).
193. Id. at 805-06.
194. Id. at 806.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. ("[D]efendant claims that (1) he is entitled to credit towards his federal sentence for
the time spent at Patuxent and therefore to release from confinement, (2) in the alternative,
since he is still under the supervision of the Patuxent authorities, service of his federal sentence
is premature, and (3) service of his federal sentence under the circumstances of this case
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the
Constitution.").
198. Id. at 806-08.
199. Id. at 806 (citing White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1930); Bailey v. Ciccone, 420
F. Supp. 344, 347 (W.D. Mo. 1976); Albori v. United States, 67 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1933)).
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dant was at fault for his liberty, the government's inaction amounting
to more than simple negligence, and whether "the situation brought
about by [the] defendant's release and his re-incarceration [was] un-
equivocally inconsistent with fundamental principles of liberty andjustice."200
In its assessment of whether the defendant was at fault for the time
he spent at liberty, the court held that "[i]t is wholly unreasonable to
ascribe fault to th[e] defendant because he did not, after [ ] release,
continue to badger the authorities to execute the detainer against
him." 2 01 According to the court, the responsibility for the defendant's
liberty rests squarely upon the government.202
The district court further described the importance of rehabilitation
by recognizing the consequence of requiring the defendant to serve
his delayed federal sentence.2 0 3 In Merritt, the defendant had reinte-
grated himself in the community 204 when he was "plucked from a
wholly peaceful and productive life." 2 0 5 The district court held that
"[a]n order requiring service of the defendant's sentence now would
needlessly jeopardize his long-term adjustment to society, disrupt both
his family and his family life, and destroy his economic base, all for no
purpose other than to secure blind obedience to the federal sentence
as it was then imposed." 2 06 For these reasons, the court vacated the
sentence and ordered his release.2 07
Much like the defendant discussed above in Merritt,2 08 Bradford has
also successfully reintegrated himself into the community over the
past six years. Bradford found work by starting his own towing busi-
ness and made many positive contributions to both his family and the
surrounding community. 209 After six years of these positive contribu-
tions, it would serve no purpose other than blind obedience to his
2002 federal sentence to disrupt his family and destroy his economic
base in requiring Bradford to serve an eighty-four-month sentence.
The defendant has demonstrated exceptional adjustment to society af-
ter living erroneously at liberty and re-incarceration would only jeop-
ardize that progress. Considerations of rehabilitation lie at the heart
of both punishment and the liberty doctrine.
200. Id. at 807 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 808
204. Id. at 806.
205. Id. at 807 n.8.
206. Id. at 808.
207. Id. at 808-09.
208. See supra Part VIA.
209. United States v. Bradford, 623 F. Supp. 2d 849, 851 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
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B. Reviewing the District Court of South Carolina's Bradford v.
Rivera Opinion
Although the District Court of South Carolina has undoubtedly
read the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan's
opinion in United States v. Bradford,2 10 it fails to appreciate the thor-
oughness of that court's research regarding the doctrine of credit for
time spent erroneously at liberty.2 1 1
The Fourth Circuit has never squarely addressed the applicability
and scope of the doctrine of credit for time spent erroneously at lib-
erty.21 Thus, given the lack of binding authority, it is appropriate for
the district court to turn to non-binding precedent decided by other
circuits to persuade and guide its decision. While the district court
claims to have reviewed "the applicable law,"2 1 1 it failed to acknowl-
edge persuasive opinions arising out of several other circuits.2 14
In its opinion, the district court noted that both the Fifth and Elev-
enth Circuits have held that the doctrine does not entitle a defendant
to credit the time spent at liberty when there is only a delay in the
commencement of a sentence.2 1 5 Again, it should be noted that the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits relied on the same binding precedent to
reach their conclusions. 1 6 While there may be "two" circuits that
have reached the same conclusion, the persuasive value is significantly
diminished given the need for the Eleventh Circuit to adhere to for-
mer Fifth Circuit precedent.2 17
Unlike the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, the Second, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits have held otherwise, applying the doctrine to situations
210. Both the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and the district court judge's
opinion cite United States v. Bradford, 623 F. Supp. 2d 849 (E.D. Mich. 2009). See Bradford v.
Rivera, No. 9:11-462-RBH-BM, 2011 WL 5827788, at *1-2 (D. S. C. Oct. 14, 2011); Bradford v.
Rivera, No. 9:11-cv-00462-RBH, 2011 WL 5827601, at *1-3 (D.S.C. Nov. 18, 2011).
211. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, through its own indepen-
dent research, recognized that there is a "fair amount of case law" about the doctrine. Bradford,
623 F. Supp. 2d at 852. The court briefly examined the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits' approach toward the doctrine, acknowledging the variety of interpretations and appli-
cation. Id. at 852-53 (citing Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 315-22 (3d Cir. 2007); Leggett v.
Fleming, 380 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Croft, 450 F.2d 1094, 1099 (6th Cir.
1971); Dunne v. Keohane, 14 F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 1994); Smith v. Swope, 91 F.2d 260, 263 (9th
Cir. 1937)).
212. The Fourth Circuit exercises appellate jurisdiction over federal district courts in the
states of Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia.
213. Bradford v. Rivera, No. 9:11-cv-00462-RBH, 2011 WL 5827601, at *4 (D.S.C. Nov. 18,
2011).
214. Id. at *1-3.
215. Id. at *4 (citing United States v. Barfield, 396 F.3d 1144, 1147-48 (11th Cir. 2005); Leg-
gett v. Fleming, 380 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 2004)).
216. See United States v. Barfield, 396 F.3d 1144, 1148 (11th Cir. 2005).
217. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)








where a defendant has not served any portion of his sentence. Each
of these circuit opinions was conspicuously absent from the district
court's review of "the applicable law.- 2 19 Also absent was any expla-
nation as to why the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' rule is more persua-
sive than the majority rule in other circuits. Contrary to the court's
result-oriented decision to dismiss Bradford's case with prejudice, it is
essential that the Fourth Circuit acknowledge that other circuits have
applied the doctrine where the commencement of a defendant's sen-
tence has been delayed.
Furthermore, the district court held that Bradford's erroneous lib-
erty was attributed, at least in part, to his own fault. 2 2 0 The court held
that the delay in designating a correctional institution resulted from
Bradford's medical condition (his cancer diagnosis). ' The court also
mentioned that Bradford did not file a motion to self-surrender or
take any action to self-surrender. 2  Accordingly, the court concluded
that Bradford was not entitled to any credit for time spent erroneously
at liberty.223
The court's reliance on Bradford's failure to take affirmative steps
to ensure his own incarceration stands in stark contrast to the com-
mon-law requirement of a defendant's clean hands. As stated by both
the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, a defendant is "at fault" if he pro-
cured his own release or delayed the commencement of the sen-
tence.2 2 4 The Tenth Circuit held that a defendant is not entitled to
credit if he escaped from custody, or violated conditions of parole.2 25
The Seventh Circuit also used the example of a prison escapee as a
defendant at fault.2 2 6 While a prisoner may not be entitled to credit if
he took affirmative acts to procure his liberty, the common law does
218. See Kiendra v. Hadden, 763 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding federal sentence began to
run on date ordered even though appellant was never taken into custody); Dunne v. Keohane, 14
F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that "government is not permitted to delay the expiration
of the sentence either by postponing the commencement of the sentence or by releasing the
prisoner for a time and the reimprisoning him"); Clark v. Floyd, 80 F.3d 371, 373-74 (9th Cir.
1996) (granting credit for time at liberty to a habeas petitioner whose sentence was merely
delayed).






224. White, 42 F.2d at 789; Dunne, 14 F.3d at 336.
225. White, 42 F.2d at 789.
226. Dunne, 14 F.3d at 336. See also Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 90 (1st Cir. 2009) (de-
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not require a defendant to take affirmative acts to correct a govern-
ment mistake.2 2 7
In this case, while it can hardly be said that one can affirmatively
seek to get brain cancer in order to delay the commencement of a
criminal sentence, Bradford could arguably be attributed to the initial
six-month period of liberty given the need for brain cancer treatment
(even though it was the sentencing court that deferred the reporting
date).2 2 8 But once this time period was over, any time spent at liberty
is solely attributed to the government's failure to designate a facility.
For more than six years, the government took no action to incarcerate
Bradford.2 2 9 While he did not take any affirmative action to ensure
his incarceration, Bradford also took no affirmative action to procure
his release or continued liberty. Bradford did not escape from federal
custody; he did not hide from or evade the government; he did not
violate any bond conditions.2 3 0 In fact, Bradford kept in regular con-
tact with the government through his Pretrial Services Officer.23 1
Despite the district court's contention that Bradford is not entitled
to credit because he did not self-surrender, the common law does not
require a defendant to bear the burden of ensuring that his criminal
sentence is properly executed amidst blatant government negli-
gence.232 A defendant is not responsible for doing the government's
work.233
C. A Recommendation to the Fourth Circuit on How to Protect
Fundamental Principles of Liberty and Justice
The government is not permitted to delay the expiration of a defen-
dant's debt to society and his reintegration into the free community.2 3 4
In keeping with this core principle of the doctrine and principles of
liberty and fundamental fairness, I recommend that the Fourth Circuit
adopt the following two-part test in determining whether to grant a
defendant relief under the doctrine of credit for time spent errone-
ously at liberty.235 While similar to the two-part test used by the Third
227. See White, 42 F.2d at 789.
228. See United States v. Bradford, 623 F. Supp. 2d 849, 850 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
229. Id. at 850-51.
230. See id. at 852.
231. See id.
232. Compare Bradford v. Rivera, No. 9:11-cv-00462-RBH, 2011 WL 5827601, at *4 (D.S.C.
Nov. 18, 2011) with White, 42 F.2d at 789 and Dunne, 14 F.3d at 336.
233. See Smith v. Swope, 91 F.2d 260, 262 (9th Cir. 1937) ("If a ministerial officer, such as a
marshal, charged with the duty to execute the court's orders, fails to carry out such orders, that
failure cannot be charged up against the prisoner.").
234. Dunne, 14 F.3d at 336.
235. Some commentators believe that a totality of the circumstances approach would be
more appropriate. See Wall, supra note 3, at 398-99.
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Circuit, this recommendation also incorporates other aspects from
opinions out of the First, Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.
First, as a threshold inquiry, the defendant must establish that he
was not at fault for his time at liberty; he must have "cleans hands
before he may receive credit for time at liberty." " Simple notions of
fairness alone dictate that a prisoner who procures his own liberty is
not entitled to credit the time spent out of custody to his federal sen-
tence.2 3 7 In fact, when a prisoner is at fault, it can hardly be said that
his liberty was erroneous. But what exactly constitutes fault?
Other circuits have overwhelmingly held that a defendant is consid-
ered at fault when he takes affirmative steps either to gain his liberty
by means of escape,2 3 8 or delays the commencement of his sentence
by evading the government. 2 3 9 However, a defendant should not have
to take any and all affirmative steps to ensure that the government
properly executes his sentence.2 4 0
Second, the defendant must show that the delay in the execution of
his sentence was the result of simple or mere government negli-
gence. 2 4 1 Nearly every court that has considered the applicability of
the doctrine requires that "the government's actions in releasing or
failing to incarcerate the prisoner be negligent." 24 2 This article's rec-
ommendation is in accord with the Third and Ninth Circuits to the
extent that simple or mere negligence, as opposed to gross negligence,
is the appropriate standard.2 4 3 Additionally, like the Ninth Circuit,
the defendant satisfies this prong by showing the negligence of any
236. Vega v. United States, 492 F.3d 310, 322 (3d (ir. 2007).
237. See, e.g., id.; White, 42 F.2d at 789 (10th Cir. 1930).
238. See, e.g., White, 42 F.2d at 789; Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 90 (1st Cir. 2009) (declin-
ing to award credit to defendant whose liberty was the result of his escape from a halfway
house).
239. Vega, 493 F.3d at 322 ("All courts agree that if a prisoner has actively effectuated his
release, for example by escaping, or actively thwarted governmental attempts to recover him, he
may not receive credit for time at liberty."); see also Dunne v. Keohane, 14 F.3d 335, 336 (7th
Cir. 1994).
240. See, e.g., Vega, 493 F.3d at 322 (holding that a defendant is not at fault if he "did not
take affirmative steps to effectuate his own sentence."); Smith, 91 F.2d at 262.
241. See, e.g., Vega, 493 F.3d at 319; Clark v. Floyd, 80 F.3d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Martinez , 837 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1988); Green v. Christiansen, 732 F.2d 1397, 1400
(9th Cir. 1984).
242. Vega, 493 F.3d at 320 (citing Leggett v. Fleming, 380 F.3d 232, 235-36 (5th Cir. 2004);
Green v. Christianscn, 732 F.2d 1397, 1400; United States v. Croft, 450 F.2d 1094, 1097 (6th Cir.
1971); Gillman v. Saxby, 392 F. Supp. 1070, 1073 (D. Haw. 1975): Derrer v. Anthony, 463 S.E.2d
690, 693 (Ga. 1995)).
243. Id. (citing Green v. Christiansen, 732 F.2d, 1397, 1399-1401(9th Cir. 1984) (granting pris-
oner credit for time at liberty event though governmental actions were not so egregious as to
constitute gross negligence thereby allowing waiver)): Clark v. Floyd, 837 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir.
1988) ("Under the doctrine of credit for time at liberty, a convicted person is entitled to credit
against his sentence for the time he was erroneously at liberty provided there is a showing of
simple or mere negligence on behalf of the government and provided that the delay in execution
of sentence was through no fault of his own.").
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governmental entity.24 4 Accordingly, credit under the doctrine should
be awarded if a defendant's liberty resulted "through the inadvertence
of agents of the government and through no fault of his own." 2 4 5 De-
termining whether or not the government was negligent and to what
degree are questions of fact for which a district court is better suited
to answer.2 4 6
This recommended two-part test places the burden on the defen-
dant to establish both prongs. Unlike the Third Circuit's burden-shift-
ing test,24 7 this article agrees with the First Circuit that the framework
248of habeas corpus places the burden of proof on the defendant.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,249 a habeas corpus petition is appropriate
when a prisoner challenges the computation or execution of a federal
sentence 2 5 0 and has exhausted the administrative remedy process.2 1
As a defendant asserting a right to credit upon the grounds that the
sentence imposed is in violation of the law, "[t]he burden of proof of
showing deprivation of rights leading to unlawful detention is on the
petitioner. "252
Thus, if a defendant shows that he was not at fault and government
negligence delayed the expiration of his sentence, credit shall be
awarded for time spent erroneously at liberty.
D. Applying the Recommendation: Returning to Mr. Bradford
Under the proposed recommendation, to receive credit for the ap-
proximate six years spent at liberty, Bradford bears the burden of
showing that he was not at fault, and his liberty was the result of gov-
244. Clark v. Floyd, 80 F.3d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1996). But see Vega, 493 F.3d at 320-21 (hold-
ing that the fault must lie with the imprisoning authority).
245. Id.
246. See Vega, 493 F.3d at 322.
247. Once the defendant shows that he was prematurely released or has failed to serve his
complete sentence, the burden shifts to the government to show either that it was not negligent
or the defendant did not have clean hands. Id. at 319. "The burden shifting scheme also places
the burden on the party that has greater access to documents tending to prove a lack of govern-
mental negligence or prisoner fault." Id. at 320.
248. Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 89-90 (1st Cir. 2009).
249. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2008) (providing that in relevant part, "[w]rits of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge
within their respective jurisdictions.").
250. See United States v. Little, 392 F.3d 671, 679 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing In re Vial, 115 F.3d
1192, 1194 n.5 (4th (ir. 1997) (en banc)).
251. See United States v. Bradford, 623 F. Supp. 2d 849, 854-55 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (holding
that if there is statutory authority for awarding defendant credit toward his sentence, he must
first seek relief from the BOP and exhaust any available administrative remedies before seeking
judicial review of the BOP's determination on this point) (citing United States v. Wilson, 503UT.S. 329, 334-36 (1992)).
252. Espinoza, 558 F.3d at 89-90 (citing Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941); Wad-
dington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 189-90 (2009); Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285-86 (2000);
Bader v. Warden. 488 F.3d 483, 488 (1st Cir. 2007)).
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ernment negligence. Turning to this article's recommended test, we
must first determine whether or not Bradford has clean hands. As
previously mentioned, Bradford cannot be considered at fault for his
liberty. 2 5 3 While the deferred sentence for six monthsm4 could argua-
bly be attributed to Bradford's need for brain cancer treatment, the
remaining time at liberty was not his fault. For more than six years,
the government took no action to incarcerate Bradford.2 5 5 While he
did not take any affirmative action to ensure his incarceration, Brad-
ford also took no affirmative action to procure his release or contin-
ued liberty. Bradford neither escaped from federal custody, nor
evaded the government's efforts to re-incarcerate him. In fact, Brad-
ford kept in regular contact with the government through his Pretrial
Services Officer and remained compliant with all bond conditions.2 56
Since the first prong has been satisfied, Bradford must now show
that the delay in the execution of his sentence was the result of simple
or mere governmental negligence. Here, the length of time in
designating a federal correctional facility alone weighs heavily in favor
of simple or mere negligence on the government's part. It took more
than six years for the government to designate a facility in South Car-
olina to which Bradford should report. 2 5 7 At a minimum, that Brad-
ford also kept in regular contact with the government during this time
would suggest negligence on the part of the government. Given that
Bradford has satisfied both prongs of the recommended test, he
should be entitled to the approximately six years he spent erroneously
at liberty.
VII. CONCLusioN
"No one talks more passionatelv about his rights than he who in the
depths of his soul doubts whether he has any. BY enlisting passion on
his side he wants to stifle his reason and its doubts: thus he will acquire
a good conscience and with it success among his fellow men."
- Friedrich Nietzsche2 58
Our Constitution prohibits the government from depriving any per-
son of liberty without due process of law.2 59 When the government's
negligent acts significantly impede upon one's liberty, there must be
an avenue to redress such errors, even in the rarest of occasions.
253. See supra Part VI.B.
254. United States v. Bradford, 623 F. Supp. 2d 849, 850 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
255. Id. at 850-51.
256. Scc id. at 852.
257. Id. at 850-51.
258. FRn-,imizw Nii* .a icin, HuMAN, Ai. Too HUMAN 191 (R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1996).
259. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. V, XIV.
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Courts, including the Fourth Circuit, have roundly rejected constitu-
tional due process claims of erroneously released prisoners. 6 o And
since the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 abolished parole, defendants
may receive credit only in carefully circumscribed situations, such as
their good behavior while incarcerated.2 6 1 Given the lack of legal ave-
nues to challenge one's federal criminal sentence, the doctrine of
credit for time spent erroneously at liberty ensures that the govern-
ment cannot delay the expiration of a defendant's sentence by failing
to incarcerate the defendant.
When courts fail to recognize the doctrine, erroneously released
prisoners who have successfully rehabilitated themselves into society
must continually suffer under the auspice that the government may
one day require re-incarceration for the service of an unfulfilled sen-
tence. If we do not afford even the avenue to challenge the govern-
ment's intrusion upon our liberty, our Union will never achieve
perfection.
260. See Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 738-46 (4th Cir. 1999)
261. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (allowing credit toward the service of a sentence for satisfactory
behavior).
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